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This paper takes us beyond the unethical act and explores the use of moral
disengagement as a multi-stage, multi-functional regulatory, and coping mechanism
that not only allows individuals to engage in unethical behavior, but also manage the
negative emotions (i.e., guilt and shame) from learning the consequences of such
behavior. A resource-based lens is applied to the moral disengagement process,
suggesting that individuals not only morally disengage prior to committing an unethical
act in order to conserve their own resources, but also morally disengage as a coping
mechanism to reduce emotional duress upon learning of the consequences of their
actions, which we describe as post-moral disengagement. These assertions are tested
using a scenario-based laboratory study consisting of 182 respondents. Findings indicate
that individuals will morally disengage in order to commit an unethical act, will experience
negative emotions from having learned of the consequences, and then will engage in
post-moral disengagement as a coping mechanism. In addition, the findings suggest
that guilt and shame relate differently to moral disengagement.
Keywords: moral disengagement, conservation of resources (COR), unethical behavior, guilt, shame
INTRODUCTION
By and large, most moral individuals have an innate desire to do what is right (Gentile, 2010).
The process by which individuals determine what is right, however, is an increasingly complex one
(Treviño et al., 2014). Ethical decision-making, in its most basic form, involves a series of cost-
benefit analyses, such that when faced with a moral dilemma, individuals are motivated to compare
the costs of violating moral standards with the perceived benefits of adhering to such standards.
Yet, often times the costs associated with the decision’s negative return for perpetrators and those
affected by their actions are not fully considered. Given that all actions generate consequences,
whether they are large or small, positive or negative, individuals are likely to experience additional
emotional discomfort after learning about the consequences resulting from their unethical act.
Although extant research has explored the emotions present at the decision-making time, the
anticipated emotional responses of engaging in an unethical act, and the emotional outcomes
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of having violated one’s moral standards (Higgins, 1987; Gaudine
and Thorne, 2001; Lowenstein et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2002;
Sayegh et al., 2004; Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe, 2008), little
is known about the emotional reactions produced as a result
of learning about the consequences of one’s unethical behavior
(Tillman et al., 2017). Hence, the present study aims to address
this gap by examining the process by which individuals, who
view themselves as moral (i.e., moral judgment) elect to engage in
unethical acts (i.e., moral actions) and deal with the consequences
of their acts (Blasi, 1980, 1983; Tillman et al., 2017).
Moral disengagement theory (MDT) suggests that individuals
tend to cognitively separate the moral component from an
otherwise unprincipled act in order to rationalize engaging
in it (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 1999, 2015). That is,
individuals employ one or more mechanisms to disengage self-
sanctions from unethical behavior in order to validate and
rationalize the behavior, allowing them to engage in or live with
the consequences of their unethical acts. Yet, MDT does not
generalize beyond the unethical act. In light of research that
suggests that thoughts of future unethical events evoke stronger
emotional reactions than thoughts of previous unethical events
(Van Boven and Ashworth, 2007; Caruso, 2010), we deem it
necessary to further enhance our understanding of the moral
disengagement process. By exploring the emotional responses
that result from learning the consequences of one’s actions and
examining the mechanisms used to cope with these emotions
we demonstrate the ongoing cycle of moral disengagement;
that is, individuals do not necessarily stop morally disengaging
after having talked themselves into engaging in the unethical
act. The process of morally disengaging is a multi-stage, multi-
functional regulatory, and coping mechanism that not only
allows individuals to engage in unethical behavior, but also
manage the negative emotions that may arise from learning the
consequences of such behavior.
Using a resource-based view of ethical decision making as
a theoretical framework, we examine simulated interactions
designed to illustrate the complex interplay between the moral
dilemmas that often emerge in the context of social relationships.
This framework is rooted in conservation of resources theory
(COR; Hobfoll, 2001; Halbesleben et al., 2009). COR may
help to explain the conditions through which individuals are
motivated to direct their existing resources to protect, replenish,
or build resources (Hobfoll, 2001; Halbesleben et al., 2009).
According to this model, resources may include emotional
energy, social relationships, time, and attention (Hobfoll, 1989).
When resources are threatened by factors such as excessive
obligations or relationship demands, individuals are motivated to
take actions to protect their available resource stocks from undue
depletion. Perceptions of threat may provoke a disinvestment
of resources such as through avoidance, denial, or withholding
effort. Conservation of resources also may trigger an investment
of resources such as when an offender attempts to avoid the loss of
a relationship by apologizing to an offended party in the wake of
inappropriate behavior.
Our study contributes to the literature in a number
of ways. First, we supplement existing research on moral
disengagement by advancing a resource-based view of ethical
decision-making. We view unethical decision-making as a
disinvestment of resources in others in order to preserve,
recover, or maximize one’s own resources (Nelissen et al., 2013).
Drawing on COR theory, we offer a novel reinterpretation
of moral disengagement that highlights efforts taken to cope
with the emotional strain associated with moral dilemmas and
unethical decision outcomes. Specifically, we describe howmoral
dilemmas, particularly those involving people in close personal
relationships, place competing demands on decision makers’
resources. Personal relationships such as those among friends or
workplace colleagues, involve mutual expectations of reciprocal
investment, continual maintenance, and avoidance of harm (e.g.,
Hansen, 1999; Methot et al., 2016). However, legitimate efforts to
maximize or protect one’s own resources may be at odds with the
resource expectations associated with upholding the standards of
friendship; self-preservation may inadvertently cause harm to a
friend or to a friendship. Navigating these competing demands
of upholding moral standards on the one hand and honoring the
obligations of friendship on the other, may drive difficult resource
allocation decisions. Some choices conserve one’s own resources
while simultaneously deprive friends of others. Such dissonance
is likely to trigger shame and guilt, particularly when decisions
cause a potential or actual loss to self or others.
Next, we argue that ethical decision-making and moral
conduct research has focused largely on what happens prior
to engaging in the unethical act and the immediate emotional
outcomes that result from having violated one’s moral standard
(e.g., Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Higgins, 1987, 1989; Jones,
1991; Robertson and Ross, 1995; Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura,
1999, 2002; Gaudine and Thorne, 2001). Missing is theory
that addresses how individuals “live with themselves” after
learning about the consequences of their actions and seek
to salvage the relationship with individuals who may have
been negatively impacted. Viewing moral disengagement via a
COR lens, we suspect that to ease or eliminate the emotional
burden associated with moral violations and the consequences
of such, individuals may engage in post-moral disengagement,
or moral disengagement after the unethical act. In addition,
engaging in post-moral disengagement in the context of personal
relationships, such as friendship, provides a mechanism for
individuals to validate or rationalize their unethical act to the
persons negatively affected by the behavior, creating an avenue
for protecting the relationship. Thus, we suggest that the process
outlined in this COR view of moral disengagement is employed
by individuals to both disengage self-sanctions before engaging in
the unethical act (thereby cognitively discounting the potential
costs) and after the act as a means of reducing or reversing
the emotional burdens that escalate as the magnitude of the
consequences of one’s actions are realized.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Conservation of Resources Theory
Conservation of resources theory (COR) highlights individuals’
motivation to defend, recover and build resources (for a recent
review, see Halbesleben et al., 2014). Perceived threats encourage
actions to protect resources from loss. In the absence of
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recognized threats, individuals are motivated to invest their
existing resources to amass more resources. In the wake of an
actual loss, individuals are motivated to invest their available
resources to interrupt downward spirals of loss, replenish that
which was lost, and to build resource reserves to address future
threats (Halbesleben and Bowler, 2007). Moreover, research in
this area suggests that individuals may experience emotional
exhaustion and burnout if they perceive an inadequate return
from prior resource investments (Halbesleben and Bowler, 2007).
An emerging perspective in the literature involves resource
conservation efforts among those in close personal relationships,
such as friendships (e.g., Hood et al., 2016; Methot et al., 2016).
The relationship among friends serves as a conduit through
which resources such as feelings of identity, inclusion and social
and emotional support (Umphress et al., 2003) flow from one to
the other. Friendships are characterized by reciprocal exchange
of resources, frequent communication, trust, and emotional
intensity (Granovetter, 1973). Despite these benefits, friendships
may have a dark side. Maintaining effective friendships comes
with a number of expectations that may lock friends into
unwanted patterns of exchange that place an undesirable drain on
friends’ personal resources (Hansen, 1999; Methot et al., 2016).
Continual resource investments are required in order to
develop and maintain friendships (Hansen, 1999; Methot et al.,
2016). Moreover, friends are expected to avoid actions that might
threaten the relationship and impede the interpersonal flow of
social and emotional resources. Friends may be resentful of
unreasonable demands placed on their limited resources which
may trigger a perceived threat. For the sake of self-preservation,
individualsmay delay or deny interpersonal resource investments
(e.g., honoring a favor from a friend). However, such actions
may be perceived as violations of friendship obligations and
cause social and emotional distress for all involved parties.
When faced with a moral dilemma in which an individual is
forced to evaluate and compare the costs of violating one’s
moral standards (as opposed to violating norms of friendship),
decision makers may display a tendency to engage in moral
disengagement.
Moral Disengagement Theory
Depicted in the first two boxes in Figure 1, moral disengagement
details the process by which individuals rationalize engaging in
immoral behavior (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 1999, 2002).
To avoid feelings of self-condemnation or loss, individuals are
motivated to refrain from engaging in behaviors that violate
their moral standards. When tempted to behave unethically,
individuals will seek to validate or rationalize the decision by
disengaging self-sanctions from the behavior.
Moral disengagement posits that there are four major sets
of disengagement practices that individuals rely on to justify
unethical behavior (Bandura, 1999). The first set of practices
involves reconstruing the conduct so that it is not considered
immoral (Bandura, 2002). For example, a healthy employee,
calling in sick from work can be cognitively reframed as self-
care. Another means of reconstruing one’s conduct involves
the use of euphemistic labeling to sanitize unprincipled acts
or pass the blame (e.g., referring to patients by their room
number enables depersonalization). An individual also may
resort to advantageous comparison in which one’s unethical
behavior is compared with an equally or greater unethical
behavior for the purposes of exoneration. The second set
of disengagement practices consists of minimizing personal
involvement. An individual may displace his or her responsibility
by minimizing or obscuring the role that he or she plays in
the unethical act. Personal involvement also may be minimized
by diffusing one’s responsibility. As Bandura (2002) notes
“when everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible”
(p. 107). Spreading the blame serves to obscure personal
agency and weaken the exercise of moral control. The third
disengagement practice involves misrepresenting or discounting
the resulting negative consequences. Individuals may be more
likely to engage in an unethical act when they do not have
to face the recipient of the mistreatment. The fourth set of
practices consists of blaming or devaluating the recipients of the
mistreatment. Assigning the blame to someone or something
else makes one’s unethical actions excusable and may even make
the individual who engages in the act feel self-righteous. An
individual also may devalue or dehumanize the recipient of the
unethical act.
Through the use of these disengagement mechanisms, MDT
suggests that individuals, who view themselves as ethical,
deactivate the self-regulatory processes that would normally
inhibit unethical behavior in order to validate or rationalize
engaging in unethical behavior (Detert et al., 2008). Moreover,
FIGURE 1 | A process model of post-moral disengagement.
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from a COR perspective, these disengagement mechanisms
effectively serve to minimize the anticipated costs of unethical
behavior, thereby providing a more favorable cost-benefit
calculus in support of the unethical act. As a result, we offer the
following:
Hypothesis 1: When asked why individuals engaged in an unethical
act they will report using a moral disengagement mechanism.
Ethical Behavior and Negative Emotions:
Shame and Guilt
Extant research predicts that individuals will compare their
self-concept with “self-guides” (Higgins et al., 1985). Failure to
match the self-concept with the personally relevant self-guide
results in negative discrepancy-induced emotions (Strauman,
1996; Tangney et al., 1998). Higgins (1987) discusses these two
broad categories of emotional syndromes as dejection-related
and agitation-related emotions. Self-discrepancies that involve
differences between an individual’s actual attributes and what
he/she wishes to attain or what others wish for him/her to attain
are likely to result in dejection-related emotions, such as shame,
whereas those that involve differences between an individual’s
actual attributes and what the individual feels he/she should
attain or what others feel he/she should attain are likely to result
in agitation-related emotions, such as feelings of guilt (Higgins,
1987; For a thorough discussion including examples that offer
clarification on the difference between attributes an individual
wishes vs. should attain please refer to Tangney and Dearing,
2002, p. 70–71). The greater the self-regulatory significance of
the discrepancy, the greater level of emotional discomfort an
individual will experience (Higgins, 1999; Bizman et al., 2001).
We view shame and guilt as emotional reactions to a perceived
threat or loss of resources. Tangney (1991) and colleagues
(Tangney et al., 1996) define guilt and shame as separate and
distinct emotions that may promote or inhibit different behaviors
(Tangney et al., 2005, 2007). Guilt refers to remorse over concerns
that one’s actions have potentially or actually caused harm,
especially to others (Tangney et al., 1996; Ferguson and Stegge,
1998). In contrast to guilt, a person experiencing shame “focuses
more on devaluing or condemning the entire self, experiences
the self as fundamentally flawed, feels self-conscious about the
visibility of one’s actions, fears scorn, and thus avoids or hides
from others” (Ferguson and Stegge, 1998, p. 20). Both guilt
and shame cause personal distress resulting from perceived
violations of one’s moral standards (Tangney, 1991). However,
they differ in focus; guilt leads to an external focus on the
effects of one’s behavior, whereas shame involves preoccupation
on one’s personal failings, deficiencies, and social standing. Guilty
parties are more likely to take actions to protect or restore
a relationship damaged by immoral or self-serving behavior.
Comparatively, ashamed parties are more likely to take actions
to defend or rebuild their own face or reputation. Thus, we
propose:
Hypothesis 2: Engaging in an unethical act results in negative
emotions.
Beyond the Unethical Act: Post-moral
Disengagement
Although previous research demonstrates the existence of
negative emotions resulting from unethical behavior, the
literature has been silent on the emotional reactions stemming
from the realization of said behaviors. We argue that, despite
coping with initial bouts of negative emotionality, as individuals
learn of the consequences of their unethical behavior, their
level of negative emotionality will intensify. Moreover, we
hypothesize that the level of severity of the consequences will
significantly influence the level of negative emotions such that
the more severe the consequences (i.e., pain and suffering
caused to others; public embarrassment; ostracized by friends)
the greater the negative emotions. As we note above, shame is
associated with preoccupation with how one’s decisions affect
the offender’s self-esteem, reputation, or standing with others
(Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 1996; Ferguson and Stegge, 1998).
In contrast, guilt tends to be other-focused and involves attention
to the adverse impact of one’s actions on others as well as
the relationship that connects them (Tangney, 1991; Tangney
et al., 1996; Ferguson and Stegge, 1998). Regret for one’s actions
often motivates guilty parties to desire to make amends for
their perceived wrongdoing (e.g., Ferguson and Stegge, 1998).
Ashamed parties may ruminate on ways to repair their public
image and regain lost social standing. This increased attention
on self- and other- preservation is emotionally taxing and places
the offender at risk of emotional exhaustion and burnout.
To cope with this post-decision dissonance (Festinger,
1957) and behavioral remorse (Oshikawa, 1969), we posit
that individuals will engage in successive rounds of moral
disengagement (i.e., post-moral disengagement). This implies a
cycle in which (a) moral disengagement justifies the commission
of an unethical act; (b) the unethical act creates negative
emotional reactions; (c) realization of the consequences of
the unethical act intensifies the underlying negative emotions;
(d) post-moral disengagement is employed to lessen, interrupt
or reverse the downward emotional spiral. Thus, we suggest the
following:
Hypothesis 3: Individuals will engage in post-moral disengagement
in order to manage the negative feelings arising from engaging in an
unethical act.
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the
severity of the outcome of the unethical act and the level of negative
emotions experienced.
Hypothesis 5: Individuals will engage in post-moral
disengagement in order to manage the negative emotions
arising from the consequences of the unethical act.
METHODS
Sample
Participants were 191 students enrolled in an undergraduate
business course at one of four universities in the U.S. The
distribution of participants across the classes was 70, 54, 33, and
34 and all received extra credit for participating. Results from
a MANOVA (Wilks’ Lambda F = 0.558, p = 0.945, η2 = 0.02)
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with course as the independent variable and the variables of
interest serving as the dependent variables revealed no significant
differences. Thus, the four subgroups were combined to create
one sample upon which all of our analyses were conducted. The
sample consisted of 92 males (48%). Sixty percent (115) of the
sample was Caucasian, 16 percent (30) was African-American,
24 percent (46) selected “other,” and the average age was 23.91
years.
Procedure
Instructors of the courses forwarded an introductory email to
their students that included a link to the electronic survey. Those
who elected to participate in the study were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions. All participants were asked to complete
the pre-manipulation scales that included the moral person scale,
scales that measured propensity to feel guilt and shame, and a
moral disengagement scale. Next, participants were asked to read
a scenario in which their friend “Pat” called them in the middle
of the night, clearly inebriated, and asked for a ride home (see
Box 1 for exact wording). After reading the scenario, participants
completed the guilt and shame scales and in their own words
described why they acted in themanner described in the scenario.
Participants’ descriptions were used to ensure that they accepted
their role in the manipulation and to verify that they used
a moral disengagement mechanism. Next, participants read a
second scenario (Box 1) that revealed what happened to Pat
after their phone call ended. Finally, respondents completed the
guilt and shamemeasures again and scales measuring post-moral
disengagement.
Manipulations Overview
Engagement in an unethical act was manipulated through a
scenario (see Box 1). Individuals in the control condition learned
that after Pat’s phone call they picked up their friend and got
Pat safely home. In the other three conditions, the participants
learn that they remained in bed and told Pat to drive home
carefully. Severity of the consequences of acting unethically
was manipulated through a second scenario that explained the
outcomes for Pat (see Box 1). There were four possible endings
designed to successively increase the severity of the consequences
for Pat. In the control condition (N = 46), Pat got home safely.
In the DUI condition (N = 45), Pat received a DIU, lost his/her
license, and spent the night in jail. In the single car accident
condition (N = 48), Pat was in a single car accident, received
a DIU, lost his/her license, and spent the night in the hospital.
Finally, in the multi-car accident condition (N = 43), Pat was
BOX 1 | Manipulations.
DISCREPANCY MANIPULATION
It is 11:00 p.m. on a Thursday night. You have been at the library since 5:00 p.m. studying for the final exam that you have tomorrow and decide to head back to
your place to get a good night’s sleep. Your friends left for an off-campus house party earlier in the evening and you told them that you would try to meet them later.
They jokingly appointed you the designated driver even though you don’t have a car. But they knew you had an important final exam that you needed to do well on,
so they’ll understand if you do not show. You get back to your place, get settled in, and start to doze off. After a while, the phone rings. You wake up and answer
it. It’s your friend Pat who sounds really drunk. Pat asks you to come drive them home. You and Pat have been friends for years now and you’ve never heard Pat
sound this drunk. Pat’s voice worries you, but since you don’t have a car, you would have to walk over to the house party (about a mile away), drive Pat’s car home,
and then walk back to your place. You think to yourself “I really have to do well on this exam tomorrow and need my sleep. It’s only a mile away…
Discrepancy Condition
…They can make it home safely.” You tell Pat that you really need to get your rest and that the drive isn’t that far. Pat begs you to come saying “I drank way too
much; I don’t even remember where my car is.” You tell Pat to go find the car and drive slowly. Everything will be OK. You turn off your phone and fall back asleep.
Control Condition
…But they can’t make it home safely.” You tell Pat that although you really need your rest you are on your way. Pat says “thank you, I drank way too much; I don’t
even remember where my car is.” You walk over to the house party, find Pat and the others, get them all in Pat’s car and drive them back to Pat’s place. Once at
Pat’s place, you stay until everyone has fallen asleep and then walk back to your place. You turn off your phone and fall back asleep.
CONSEQUENCE MANIPULATION
Control Condition
The next morning when you turn on your phone you see that you have a message from Pat. Pat is very thankful that you came to pick them up. Pat says that if it
weren’t for you, they wouldn’t have made it home safely last night. Pat says that it is good to have friends like you who take their responsibility as a designated driver
seriously.
DUI Condition
The next morning when you turn on your phone you see that you have a message from one of your friends. Pat was pulled over minutes after leaving the party. Pat
was arrested and has been charged with a DUI (driving under the influence). Pat’s license has been revoked and will not be allowed to drive for a year. No one was
hurt. As the significance of this situation begins to sink in, you remember that you told Pat that everything would be OK.
Single-Car Accident Condition
The next morning when you turn on your phone you see that you have a message from one of your friends. Pat has been in an accident. Pat drove head on into a
telephone pole minutes after leaving the party and has been taken to the hospital. The doctor thinks Pat will be able to go home tomorrow. Pat has been charged
with a DUI (driving under the influence). Pat’s license has been revoked and will not be allowed to drive for a year. No one other than Pat was hurt. As the significance
of this situation begins to sink in, you remember that you told Pat that everything would be OK.
Multi-Car Accident Condition
The next morning when you turn on your phone you see that you have a message from one of your friends. Pat has been in a serious accident. Pat drove head-on
into a minivan with a family of four in it minutes after leaving the party. Everyone was taken to the hospital with life-threatening injuries. The doctors do not think that
the baby girl that was in the minivan is going to survive her injuries. Pat has been charged with a DUI (driving under the influence). Pat’s license has been revoked
and will not be allowed to drive for a year. As the significance of this situation begins to sink in, you remember that you told Pat that everything would be OK.
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in a multi-car accident in which others were seriously injured,
received a DIU, lost his/her license, and spent the night in the
hospital.
Manipulation Generation and Validation
To generate a manipulation that potential respondents would
find relevant and unethical, we conducted a focus group with 50
business undergraduates attending a university in the U.S., which
was not one from which we collected our data. Participants in the
focus group included 16 men (32%), 34 (68%) were Caucasians,
and ranged in age from 20 to 24. We began the session by
describing a scenario in which an individual cheating on an
exam. Discussions clearly indicated that the participants did not
view this act as unethical. So, we opened the floor to the group
and asked them to offer examples of unethical situations they
often face. Situations offered included cheating in a relationship,
shoplifting, and lying to one’s parents. However, the ethicality
of these situations was not unanimous. One situation that did
unite the participants was allowing a friend to drive drunk.
Based on their feedback we developed a manipulation in which
respondents were told they allowed a friend to drive drunk.
To ensure our manipulation was valid, we needed to confirm
that allowing a friend to drive drunk was a behavior in which
potential respondents had engaged. To test this assertion, we
asked 129 students—66 (51%)male, 98 (76%) classified as Juniors
or Seniors, and 108 (84%) Caucasian—enrolled in business
classes at a university in the U.S., which was not one from which
our data were gathered, to complete a 12-item survey. Items on
the survey asked them to indicate whether they had engaged in
the behaviors listed including whether they allowed a friend to
drive drunk and whether they had ridden in a car with a driver
who was under the influence. A total of 101 (78%) answered yes
to one or both of these statements. These results suggest that
the behavior assigned to our respondents in the manipulation
scenario was one that was common to respondents from our
population of interest.
We conducted a pretest to confirm that our scenarios were
viewed as plausible and relevant. The pretest sample was
composed of 40 undergraduate students enrolled in a business
course at a university in the U.S., which was not one from which
our data were gathered. The average age of the respondents was
22.05 years, 22 (55%) were male, and 31 (78%) were Caucasian.
To ascertain whether the respondents accepted the actions
described in the scenario as their own, we content analyzed the
responses to the open-ended question: Why did you let Pat drive
drunk? The vast majority of the respondents (90%) offered a
reason that aligned with the initial scenario (e.g., “Because I
had already told him I had a huge test tomorrow and needed
rest”). Only 4 (10%) indicated that they would not have acted as
the scenario suggested (e.g., “I wouldn’t have told Pat to drive.
I would have told him to spend the night there”).
To test whether our outcome manipulation was successful,
we conducted a MANOVA with the outcome condition serving
as the independent variable and each of the manipulation check
items serving as the dependent variables. The overall omnibus
F-test was significant (Wilks’ Lambda F = 88.74, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.63). Results for the follow up one-way ANOVAs using
a Scheffe post-hoc test, showed that three of our manipulation
check items were significant and the means were as expected.
However, one of the manipulation check items (“Although Pat
was in an accident, he did not go to the hospital.”) failed to
distinguish differences among the groups. Upon further review,
we determined that the double-barreled nature of the item
confused the respondents. To correct this problem, we changed
the wording of the item to “Pat was in a single car accident.”
Finally, we analyzed the results for the presence of demand
characteristics. In order to determine if the respondents were able
to ascertain the true purpose of our study we asked them to tell
us what they thought the survey was about by selecting one of
three options: How individuals respond to life situations (our
cover story), I don’t know, or other followed by blank to indicate
in their own words the purpose of the study. Results from an
ANOVA (F = < 1, p = 0.56, η2 = 0.05) revealed no differences
in the responses to the demand characteristic check item across
the conditions. The majority (29 or 73%) selected our cover story
explanation, an additional 4 (10%) indicated that they did not
know, and the remaining 7 (18%) selected other. None of the
open-ended comments (e.g., self-esteem, self-values) mentioned
the true purpose of the study. With the exception of the one
manipulation check item, which we changed for use in the
experiment, these results demonstrated that the manipulations
were effective.
Initial Manipulation Confirmation
Prior to conducting any analyses, we first confirmed that the
respondents in our experimental conditions accepted their role
in the manipulation. Just as we did in the pretest analyses, we
asked the respondents to tell us in their own words why they
let Pat drive drunk. This open-ended question appeared after the
time 1 guilt and shame scales for those not in the control group.
We removed the respondents (9 or 7%) who indicated that they
would not have acted this way (e.g., “I wouldn’t have let him drive
drunk.”) from the sample dropping our overall N to 182.
Outcome Manipulation Confirmation
We conducted a MANOVA to test whether our outcome
manipulation was successful. Specifically, the outcome condition
served as the independent variable and each of the manipulation
check items served as the dependent variables. The overall
omnibus F-test was significant (Wilks’ Lambda F = 70.32,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.588). Results for the follow up one-way
ANOVAs using a Scheffe post-hoc test, shown in Table 1, reveal
that each of our manipulation check items was significant and the
means were as expected confirming that outcome manipulation
was successful.
Pre-manipulation Measures
Moral Person
Prior to being exposed to the initial manipulation, we measured
the degree to which the participants viewed themselves as moral
individuals with a 15-item scale (α= 0.75) developed by Sekerka
et al. (2009). Reponses were made on a 5-point Likert scale (1 =
Definitely not true of me and 5=Definitely true of me). A sample
item is “I am determined to do the right thing.”
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TABLE 1 | Manipulation check results.
Control
(N = 46)
DUI
(N = 45)
Single-car accident
(N = 48)
Multi-car accident
(N = 43)
Manipulation check item F p X X X X
I made sure Pat did not drive drunk by
fulfilling my role as the designated driver.
78.74 0.00 4.33a 1.67b 1.46b 1.63b
Pat received a DUI. 86.20 0.00 1.61a 4.51b 4.58b 4.30b
Pat was in a single car accident. 73.08 0.00 1.48a 1.73a 4.42b 1.81a
Pat was in an accident that involved
another vehicle.
84.53 0.00 1.50a 1.53a 1.50a 4.37b
N = 182. df = 3,178. Means in the same row with the same subscript are not significantly different from one another.
Propensity to Feel Guilt and Shame
Prior to being exposed to the initial manipulation, we
administered 11-items from Tangney et al. (2000) guilt and
shame scale (TOSCA-3) to determine whether the participants
had the ability to feel guilt and shame (α = 0.62). The items in
the scale describe potential situations (e.g., you broke something
at work) while the responses describe both a guilt (e.g., You
would think “This is making me anxious. I need to either fix it
or get someone else to.”) and a shame (e.g., You would think
about quitting.) reaction to the situation. Participants indicated
how likely they were to act in the manner described by both the
guilt and the shame reactions on a 5-point Likert scale (1= Very
unlikely and 5= Very likely) of the scale.
Moral Disengagement
Prior to reading the initial manipulation, participants completed
the 32-item (α = 0.93) moral disengagement scale (Bandura
et al., 1996). Reponses were made on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree). A sample item
is “People cannot be blamed for misbehaving if their friends
pressured them to do it.”
Post-manipulation Measures
Guilt
We used the 6-item guilt scale developed by Kubany et al. (1996)
to measure guilt at two points in time: after the initial scenario
(α = 0.93) and after the final scenario (α = 0.94). A sample item
is “I did something that I should not have done.” Responses were
made on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all true and 5 =
Extremely true).
Shame
We used the 4-item shame scale developed by Andrews et al.
(2002) to measure shame at two points in time: after the initial
scenario (α = 0.73) and after the final scenario (α = 0.79).
A sample item is “How likely are you to try and cover up or
conceal what you did from your friends?” Responses were made
on a 5-point Likert scale (5= Very likely and 1= Very unlikely).
Post-moral Disengagement
Tomeasure post-moral disengagement, we created 11 statements
that mapped to Bandura’s (1986) four moral disengagement
categories. The items are shown in Table 2. To explore the
underlying factor structure of these items, we conducted an
exploratory factor analysis with SPSS 18 using a principal axis
factoring extraction method and an oblimin rotation. The data
used for these analyses (N = 136) came from the individuals
in the three manipulated outcome conditions because those in
the control group did not respond to these items. Applying
a factor-loading cut off criteria of 0.45 produced two factors
with no cross-loadings (see Table 2) and one item that we
dropped because it failed to load on either factor. The first
factor, which we named diffusing and displacing responsibility,
contained all of the items we developed to map to Bandura’s
(1999) second and fourth moral disengagement categories.
These categories include disengagement practices that minimize
personal involvement and blame or devalue the recipients. The
second factor, which we named minimizing and reconstruing
actions, includes all of the items we created to map to Bandura’s
(1999) first and third moral disengagement categories. These
categories include reconstruing one’s conduct so that it is not
considered immoral and misrepresenting or discounting the
resulting negative consequences. We created one scale for each
factor by averaging the items that loaded on the factor. The
resulting Cronbach alphas were 0.87 and 0.77 respectively.
Manipulation Check Items
At the end of the survey, participants were asked to complete a 4-
item manipulation check scale. The four items included “I made
sure Pat did not drive drunk by fulfillingmy role as the designated
driver.” (control group), “Pat received a DUI.” (all groups except
the control group), “Pat was in a single car accident.” (single-car
accident condition), and “Pat was in an accident that involved
another vehicle.” (multi-car accident condition). Responses were
made on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree and 5 =
Strongly agree).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations
among the measured variables of interest. As the correlations
between our post-moral disengagement scales exceeded 0.50, we
followed the procedure outlined by Fornell and Larcker (1981)
to test the discriminant validity of our scales. Specifically, we
calculated the square root of the average variance explained
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TABLE 2 | Factor loadings for 11-item post-moral disengagement measure.
Item Diffusing
or displacing
responsibility
Minimizing
and
reconstruing
actions
Make it clear to Pat that you recognize
that your action of not providing a ride was
a grave misstep, but that you felt you had
no other alternatives.
0.89
Tell Pat that there were circumstances
beyond your control, which caused you to
wrongly refuse to give Pat a ride.
0.86 −0.11
Tell Pat that you recognize that not picking
Pat up was a terrible thing to do, but
remind Pat that Pat’s timing gave you no
choice.
0.75
Explain to Pat that while your actions were
bad, you did the best you could at the time
0.63
Make sure Pat knows that not giving Pat a
ride was a critical error, but then explain to
Pat why you could not have prevented the
outcome of the evening.
0.49 0.29
Take responsibility for not giving Pat a ride,
but then point out that your actions could
have been worse.
0.77
Let Pat know that you are responsible for
not providing a ride, but that this act alone
is not bad.
0.68
Admit that you did not give Pat a ride, but
remind Pat that your actions did not hurt
anyone.
0.63
Make sure Pat knows that you understand
that you are responsible for not giving Pat
a ride, but explain how the situation may
turn out to be a benefit Pat in the long-run.
0.58
Accept responsibility for not giving Pat a
ride, but try to make your actions appear
less severe than they actually are.
0.16 0.47
Let Pat know that while not providing a
ride was a serious slip, others’ behaviors
contributed to the evening’s events too.
0.35 0.38
Eigenvalue 4.38 1.03
Variance explained 39.79 9.40
Loadings > 0.45 are bolded; loadings < 0.10 are suppressed.
for all variables. To demonstrate discriminant validity, this
value (presented on the diagonal in Table 3) must exceed the
corresponding latent variable correlations in the same row and
column. If this condition is met, then there is evidence that the
variance shared between any two constructs (i.e., the correlation)
is less than the average variance explained by the items that
compose the scale (i.e., square root of the average variance).
As shown in Table 3, this condition is met for the six unique
variables in our study. This condition is not met, nor was it
expected to be, for the measures that used the same items (i.e.,
propensity to feel guilt and shame) or that were measured at two
points in time (i.e., guilt and shame).
Pre-manipulation Scale Results
Prior to reading the initial scenario, participants completed the
moral person, moral disengagement, and propensity to feel guilt
and shame scales. These scales were used as baseline indicators
for the degree to which the respondents viewed themselves as
moral individuals who were capable of morally disengaging and
feeling guilt and shame. This step was essential to our being able
to create a discrepancy. To ensure that the participants did not
differ significantly on these measures, we conducted a MANOVA
with the manipulated condition as the independent variable and
the four pre-manipulation scales as the dependent variables. The
overall omnibus F-test (Wilks’ Lambda F = < 1, p = 0.783,
η
2
= 0.02) was not significant. The means for moral person
ranged from 3.85 to 3.99, from 2.44 to 2.67 for moral
disengagement, from 3.48 to 3.57 for propensity to feel guilt,
and from 3.19 to 3.31 for propensity to feel shame. These results
demonstrate no significant differences between the individuals
on the four pre-manipulation variables. Thus, the randomization
process was successful and any mean differences among the
groups can be attributed to the manipulations.
Moral Disengagement
To test Hypothesis 1, we needed to demonstrate that individuals,
who engaged in an unethical act, reported using a moral
disengagement mechanism. To do this we examined the
responses to the open-ended question: Why did you let Pat drive
drunk? Specifically, two of the authors independently coded the
responses (N = 136) from the participants assigned to the three
manipulated conditions into as many of Bandura’s (1986) four
categories of moral disengagement as appropriate. For instance,
the statement “Because I had an important exam that I needed
rest for” was coded into the first category because the individual
reframed the act as personally acceptable while the statement
“I was concerned of my test in the morning and justified him
driving because he was only driving a short distance” was coded
into the first category for the same reason and the third category
because the individual also discounted the negativity of telling Pat
to drive drunk. The agreement rate was 96% (131/136). Another
author served as the tiebreaker and coded the 5 statements where
agreement was not reached. In each of these cases, the additional
author matched one of the original codes.
The majority (89 or 61%) of the reasons for letting Pat
drive drunk were coded into the first category. To fall into this
category, respondents needed to reconstrue their conduct so
that it was not considered immoral. To accomplish this, they
described their behavior as socially and personally acceptable.
Some sample items include “Because I had to get some rest
for the test,” or “Because I had a final exam in the morning.”
The second category involved minimizing one’s involvement.
A total of 26 (18%) responses were placed in this category.
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TABLE 3 | Correlations, means, and standard deviations.
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Moral persona 3.90 0.44 0.56
2. Propensity to feel guilta 3.54 0.34 0.17* 0.38
3. Propensity to feel shamea 3.25 0.49 0.09 0.37*** 0.33
4. Moral disengagementa 2.53 0.85 −0.29*** −0.15* −0.06 0.58
5. Guilt time 1a 2.72 0.60 0.08 0.12 0.23** −0.11 0.75
6. Shame time 1a 3.02 0.96 0.03 0.14 0.34*** −0.04 0.48*** 0.62
7. Guilt time 2a 2.83 0.65 0.06 0.15* 0.23** −0.02 0.78*** 0.49*** 0.73
8. Shame time 2a 3.14 1.08 −0.01 0.19* 0.29*** 0.06 0.41*** 0.80*** 0.50*** 0.68
9. Diffusing and displacing responsibilitiesb 2.76 1.00 −0.04 0.09 0.16 0.26** −0.25** 0.12 −0.25** 0.24** 0.76
10. Minimizing and reconstruing actionsb 2.39 0.86 −0.11 0.08 0.10 0.39*** −0.10 0.19* −0.07 0.27** 0.51*** 0.64
aN = 182. bN = 136. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Values on the diagonal are the square root of the average variance explained which must be larger than all zero-order
correlations in the row and column in which they appear to demonstrate discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
TABLE 4 | Mean comparisons by condition for guilt and shame at time 1 and time 2.
Condition N Guilt Shame
Time 1 Time 2 t p Time 1 Time 2 t p
Control 46 2.26 2.29 −0.53 0.60 2.28 2.27 0.08 0.94
DUI 45 2.81 2.85 −0.63 0.53 3.25 3.34 −1.21 0.23
Single-car 48 2.89 3.10 −4.53 0.00 3.24 3.44 −1.71 0.08
Multi-car 43 2.93 3.09 −1.97 0.05 3.33 3.50 −2.31 0.02
N = 182.
Sample items include “There was no agreement that I would
be the designated driver,” or “I don’t have a car to drive them
in the first place.” Only 10 (7%) of the responses were coded
into the third category that required respondents to misrepresent
or discount the negative consequences. Sample items in this
category include “He was only driving a short distance,” or
“It was only a mile away, if he drove slowly, it would not be
as dangerous.” Finally, 22 (15%) of the responses were placed
into the fourth category. Responses in this category blamed or
dehumanized Pat, the recipient of the unethical act. Sample
items include “He needs to be responsible for his own actions,”
or “Pat shouldn’t have gotten that drunk.” These results offer
support for Hypothesis 1 as the reasons given for acting in an
unethical manner fell into Bandura’s (1986)moral disengagement
categories.
Negative Emotions
To test Hypothesis 2, we needed to establish that individuals who
acted ethically (i.e., control group) felt less negative emotions
than those who engaged in an unethical act (i.e., themanipulation
groups). To do this, we compared the time 1 guilt and shame
scores for the control group, who did the right thing, to those in
the manipulation conditions, who remained in bed. Individuals
in the control condition should not feel negative emotions
because they did what a “moral person” would do. Those in the
manipulated conditions should feel negative emotions because,
although they view themselves as a moral person based on the
pre-manipulation results, they failed to do what a “moral person”
should do.
Results from a MANOVA in which guilt and shame at time 1
served as the dependent variables and the experimental condition
served as the independent variable revealed a significant overall
omnibus F-test (Wilks’ Lambda F = 10.45, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15).
The between-subjects effects demonstrated a main effect for
each guilt (F = 15.50, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21) and shame
(F = 15.02, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20). A Scheffe post-hoc test
showed that the means for guilt (2.26) and shame (2.28) for
the control group were significantly lower than the means from
the other three conditions (2.81 and 3.25 DUI; 2.89 and 3.25
single-car accident; 2.93 and 3.33multi-car accident, respectively;
p < 0.001) and that the means in the other three conditions
were not significantly different from one another, as displayed in
Table 4. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported as we can conclude
that the individuals in the manipulated conditions felt negative
emotions after engaging in an unethical act compared to those in
the control condition.
Managing the Negative Feelings from the
Unethical Act
Given that Hypothesis 2 was supported, we next investigated
whether individuals will engage in post-moral disengagement
in order to manage the negative emotions felt. To test this
assumption, we correlated the post-moral disengagement scales
with guilt and shame at time 1 as these values reflect the subjects’
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awareness of their engagement in an unethical act. Two of the
four correlations, shown in Table 3, were significant. Minimizing
and reconstruing actions was significantly correlated with shame
at time 1 indicating that as the level of shame one feels increases
so does the use of this form of post-moral disengagement.
While the correlation between guilt at time 1 and diffusing and
displacing responsibilities was significant, it was negative, which
is opposite of what we predicted.
We also regressed each factor of moral disengagement on guilt
and shame measured at time 1 in order to take into account
the variance explained by each after accounting for the other.
These analyses are displayed on Table 5. Multi-collinearity was
assessed via two commonly used indices: tolerance and variance
inflation factor (VIF), where tolerance values should be close to
one and VIF scores should be less than two (Miles and Shelvin,
2003). There is no evidence of collinearity in our results. We
find a positive and significant relationship between shame and
both diffusing and displacing responsibilities and minimizing
and reconstruing actions (B = 0.321, p = 0.004 and B = 0.286,
p = 0.004, respectively). We also find that there is a negative and
significant relationship between guilt and each factor of themoral
disengagement scale (B = −0.606, p < 0.001 and B = −0.304,
p = 0.028, respectively). Guilt and shame explain 11.5% of the
variance in diffusing and displacing responsibilities and 6.9% of
the variance in minimizing and reconstruing actions. Hypothesis
3 received partial support; while both guilt and shame predicted
moral disengagement, guilt was in the opposite direction that we
were expecting.
Severity of the Outcome
The outcome scenarios were designed to successively increase
the consequences for Pat. Hypothesis 4 predicted that the levels
of guilt and shame would be positively related to the negative
consequences of the unethical act. To test this contention,
we conducted a MANOVA with condition serving as the
independent variable and guilt and shame at time 2 as the
dependent variables, as displayed inTable 4. The overall omnibus
F-test was significant (Wilks’ Lambda F = 12.81, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.18). The between-subjects effects demonstrated a main
effect for guilt (F = 21.05, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26) and shame
(F = 16.51, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.22). The Scheffe post-hoc revealed
that the control group had the lowest level of guilt (2.29) and
shame (2.27) and that these means were significantly lower than
the means of the three other conditions. However, the means
for guilt and shame in the other three conditions (2.85 and 3.34
DUI, 3.10 and 3.44 single-car accident, and 3.09 and 3.50 multi-
car accident, respectively) were not significantly different from
one another. Thus, while knowing the consequences for Pat did
increase respondents’ levels of guilt and shame, the severity of the
outcomes did not differentially increase these feelings. Thus, no
support was found for Hypothesis 4.
Post-moral Disengagement
Our previously reported findings demonstrate that individuals
do feel negative emotions after learning the consequences of
their unethical act. Our final hypothesis proposes a way in
which individuals may deal with these feelings. Specifically,
we predicted that individuals will engage in post-moral
disengagement in order to manage the negative emotions felt. To
test this assumption, we correlated the post-moral disengagement
scales with guilt and shame at time 2 as these values reflect the
subjects’ awareness of the consequences for Pat. Three of the four
correlations, shown inTable 3, were significant. Both correlations
with shame at time 2 were significant indicating that as the level
of shame one feels increases so does the use of both forms of post-
moral disengagement. However, only the correlation between
guilt at time 2 and diffusing and displacing responsibilities was
significant, and this correlation was negative.
We regressed each factor of moral disengagement on guilt
and shame measured at time 2. These analyses are displayed on
Table 5. Multi-collinearity was not an issue with these data. We
find a positive and significant relationship between shame and
both diffusing and displacing responsibilities and minimizing
and reconstruing actions (B = 0.407, p < 0.001 and B = 0.325,
p < 0.001, respectively). We find that there is a negative and
significant relationship between guilt and each factor of themoral
disengagement scale (B = −0.603, p < 0.001 and B = −0.283,
p = 0.022, respectively). Guilt and shame explain 11.7% of the
TABLE 5 | Regression results for the effects of negative emotions (guilt and shame) on moral disengagement.
Time 1 Time 2
Diffusing and displacing
responsibilities
Minimizing and
reconstruing actions
Diffusing and displacing
responsibilities
Minimizing and reconstruing
actions
Intercept 3.464 (0.457)*** 2.326 (0.403)*** 3.194 (0.424)*** 2.127 (0.389)***
Guilt −0.606 (0.155)*** −0.304 (0.137)* −0.603 (0.137)*** −0.283 (0.122)*
Shame 0.321 (0.111)** 0.286 (0.098)** 0.407 (0.092)*** 0.325 (0.082)***
0.842/1.188 0.842/1.188 0.865/1.157 0.865/1.157
F 8.679 4.953 14.275 8.205
R2 0.115 0.069 0.117 0.110
AdjR2 0.102 0.055 0.164 0.096
p-value <0.001 0.008 <0.001 <0.001
N = 136. df = 2,133 for each model. Standard error for each estimate in parentheses. All beta coefficients are unstandardized. Tolerance and VIF are in italic bold respectively.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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variance in diffusing and displacing responsibilities and 11.0% of
the variance in minimizing and reconstruing actions. Combined,
these results partially support Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 was
supported for shame, but not for guilt, as the relationship
between guilt and moral disengagement was found to be negative
instead of positive, which is opposite of what we predicted.
Post-Hoc Tests
Wewere also interested in whether participants would experience
a change each in guilt and shame between the time they engaged
in the unethical act (time 1) and the time they were told of
the consequences of their act (time 2). We used a repeated
measures MANOVA where condition served as the between-
subjects factor, time (1 and 2) was the within-subjects factor and
guilt and shame served as the dependent variables. The omnibus
F-test suggests that there was an effect of time [Wilks’ Lambda
F(2, 177) = 7.84, p = 0.001, η
2
= 0.08], but no difference between
the conditions by time [Wilks’ Lambda F(6, 354) = 1.38, p = 0.22,
η
2
= 0.04] on guilt and shame. Univariate tests also indicated that
there was not a condition effect on either guilt [F(3, 178) = 2.27,
p = 0.082, η2 = 0.02] or shame [F(3, 178) = 0.924, p = 0.43,
η
2
= 0.02] across time, but there was a time effect for each guilt
[F(1, 178) = 12.93, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.07] and shame [F(1, 178)
= 5.47, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.03], as displayed visually in Figure 2.
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, we find that learning of the
consequence of one’s act produces increased levels of negative
emotions compared to simply knowing that one has engaged
in an unethical act. However, these effects did not differ by
condition.
DISCUSSION
Contributions and Implications for the
Behavioral Ethics Literature
Our study contributes to the field of behavioral ethics in several
ways. First, we offer a potential explanation of how individuals,
who view themselves as moral, are able to both engage in
and subsequently cope with an unethical act. To navigate these
decisions, MDT posits that individuals are able to justify their
unprincipled behavior and reduce feelings of condemnation or
self-censure through moral disengagement. However, they still
experience negative emotions as a result of the inconsistency
between their behavior and their self-guide. Our results suggest
that behavioral ethicists should continue to explore not only
the causes of individual behavior but also the psychological
consequences imposed on the individual after engaging in such
acts.
Second, our study extends MDT by examining what happens
after the negative emotions that result from having engaged
in the unethical act. Research has not ventured far past
exploring the immediate outcomes resulting from behaving
unethically (Detert et al., 2008; Tillman et al., 2017), yet it
indicates that individuals will experience a greater magnitude
of negative emotions after having learned that one’s behavior
was responsible for causing a negative outcome (Kubany and
Watson, 2003). Our study sought to explore the emotions that
individuals experience after learning the consequences of their
unethical behavior and how they cope with these emotions.
Our results indicate that individuals did experience greater
negative emotions after having learned the consequences of
their unethical behavior compared to the emotions experienced
immediately following the act. In addition, and in line with
previous work (Johnson and Connelly, 2016), we find that
guilt and shame relate differently to moral disengagement.
Our findings suggest shame was positively related and guilt
was negatively related to moral disengagement, implying
that those who felt higher levels of guilt to some extent
accepted fault for the outcome and did not rationalize it by
morally disengaging. Experiencing a negative emotion does
not universally lead to moral disengagement coping strategies;
shame may drive individuals to morally disengage to save their
reputation. Conversely, guilt may reduce moral disengagement
as individuals seek actions to rectify the immoral action in other
ways.
Third, our study contributed to the extension of MDT by
examining whether the severity of the known consequences
influences the level of negative emotions felt by individuals. We
proposed that the more severe the consequence the greater the
level of negative emotions individuals would experience. Our
results indicate, however, that despite the various degrees of
severity in the consequences of one’s actions, individuals’ level
of negative emotions did not change significantly. These findings
suggest that just learning of the negative consequences of one’s
unethical actions will cause individuals to experience negative
emotions.
Finally, the present study examined whether moral
disengagement serves as a multi-stage regulatory mechanism.
Although moral disengagement has been shown to be a proactive
regulatory mechanism that allows individuals to engage in
unethical behavior, our study seems to suggest that it also may
serve as a coping mechanism that allows individuals to deal with
the negative emotions that arise after knowing the consequences
of an unethical act. The implication here is there is a need for
individuals who engage in unethical behaviors to continue to
convince themselves and others that their behavior was justified.
Thus, we encourage behavioral ethics researchers to continue
exploring the nature of explanatory mechanisms at different
stages in the ethical decision-making process.
Implications for Practice
Although our study’s main focus was to test our theoretical
hypotheses, the results of this study offer several important
practical implications. Past research has shown that emotions
that are the result of negative experiences can be functional (e.g.,
Haidt, 2003; De Hooge et al., 2008, 2011). Our findings suggest
that individuals who felt higher levels of guilt after learning
about the consequences of their unethical act did not attempt
to rationalize their actions by morally disengaging. This finding
may be considered functional if these individuals did not revert
to morally disengaging as a means of coping with the negative
emotions and rather assumed responsibility for the consequences
of their unethical actions or resorted to other actions aimed at
rectifying their immoral act. Our findings offer a preliminary
glimpse into how individuals who experience feelings of guilt
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FIGURE 2 | Comparisons of time 1 and time 2 by condition for guilt and shame.
after learning of the consequences of their unethical act cope
with the negative emotions, but further investigation aimed at
examining the lingering effects of guilt as well as its influence on
future ethical decision-making is warranted.
In contrast, our findings indicate that individuals who
experienced higher levels of shame after learning about the
consequences were more likely to morally disengage than their
counterparts. Individuals who experience shame may morally
disengage in an effort to save their reputation since shame
involves a preoccupation with one’s social standing. Typically
shame is associated with feelings of anger and of inferiority
(Allan et al., 1994), and individuals might cope by rationalizing
or avoiding the situation altogether to reduce their discomfort,
as this study would suggest. Alternatively, previous research
suggests that under specific conditions, such as when the
presence of shame is relevant to one’s pursuit of goals, shamed
individuals may bemore likely to engage in prosocial behaviors to
defend, rebuild, and regain their standing (DeHooge et al., 2008).
While under these conditions, these individuals may engage
in good behaviors toward those who may have been impacted
by their acts to recuperate their social standing, but at what
opportunity cost? As these individuals attempt to repair damaged
relationships, others in the individuals’ environment may be
ignored.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although this study makes a number of contributions to the
extant literature, there are limitations. First, because our sample
was composed of college students, caution should be used
in generalizing the results from our study (Gordon et al.,
1986). However, we feel our sample is appropriate given the
focus on psychological processes and emotional consequences.
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Various researchers (e.g., Greenberg, 1987) have concluded that
student samples do not present problems above and beyond
other samples and may be appropriate and useful in studying
psychological processes. We ensured that the scenario tested
was applicable to the population studied. Nevertheless, future
research should utilize more diverse samples in order to test the
generalizability of the findings.
Second, our study design did not allow participants to decide
whether or not to engage in an unethical act. Instead, the
participants were provided with a discrepancy to evaluate. As
a result, it is possible that individuals made their retrospective
decisions about moral disengagement with this in mind.
Although results of our pretests confirmed that the vast
majority of the sample has engaged in the assigned act and
view it as an unethical behavior, future research may benefit
from an approach that incorporates extensive interviews about
individuals’ own personal experiences to more accurately assess
the ethicality of the event, and the relevance to self-guides
and interpersonal interactions. A retrospective look at such acts
also will allow researchers to investigate the notion that moral
disengagement is a continuous process that allows individuals
to continue with the act even after consideration and initial
engagement. Extensions of this work might also consider the
complex interplay of unethical responses by multiple actors,
and not only by the protagonist. Additionally, future research
may explore the effects of continuous moral disengagement;
that is, as individuals disengage in order to act unethically
and subsequently rely on disengagement as a coping strategy,
does the process of morally disengaging become easier to
validate?
Finally, the current research tested only negative emotions.
Future research should explore positive emotions such as
happiness or satisfaction. Just as high levels of discrepancies
produce feelings such of guilt, contempt, anger, or shame, low
levels of discrepancy or the absence of the discrepancies
in various self-guides should likewise produce more
positive feelings.
CONCLUSION
The present study integrated MDT and COR to provide a
potential examination into the process by which individuals, who
view themselves as moral, disengage to commit unethical acts
and the negative emotions that result when these individuals
learn the consequences of their unethical behavior. We suggest
that individuals may turn to moral disengagement not only
to validate engaging in an unethical act, but to re-validate
their decision after learning the negative consequences of their
behavior. Disengaging after learning the negative consequences
of one’s unethical act serves as a means of managing relationships
with those who were hurt as a result of the act.
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